Problems with digest algorithmsAs of now, the only digest algorithm used by GnuPG which has
severe weaknesses is the MD5 algorithm. In particular it is
easy to create two files yielding the same digest value. The
result is that a signature on one text may be valid for a second
text as well. The creator of the signature can use this for
certain attacks. (Technically this is called a collision attack.) It is currently not possible to create an arbitrary text
matching a given digest (and thus a signature). However,
researchers are working on methods to achieve this (known as a
pre-image attack). We can't say how long it will take them to
come up with such an attack. Thus it is better to entirely
avoid the MD5 algorithm and don't put any value in signatures
based on MD5. Although the SHA-1 algorithm shows signs of weaknesses as well,
it is still very hard and time consuming to create collisions.
Mounting a pre-image attack is still far out of reach. Thus for
the standard use of GnuPG, the signature based on SHA-1 are
still fine. To be prepared for future developments, GnuPG is
moving forward and some defaults have been changed to prefer
SHA-256 over SHA-1. If in a few years the installed code base
of modern GnuPG versions is large enough we are prepared to
deprecate SHA-1 then. |